

| | | | |
|------------------|--|----------|-----------|
| TRANSMITTAL SLIP | | DATE | |
| TO: <i>D/ICS</i> | | | |
| ROOM NO. | | BUILDING | |
| REMARKS: | | | |
| | | | |
| FROM: | | | |
| ROOM NO. | | BUILDING | EXTENSION |

STAT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89M00699R002101700001-8

Page Denied

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89M00699R002101700001-8

ROUTING SLIP

TO: *[Signature]*

| | | ACTION | INFO | DATE | INITIAL |
|----|------------|--------|------|------|---------|
| 1 | DCI | | X | | |
| 2 | DDCI | | X | | |
| 3 | EXDIR | | | | |
| 4 | D/ICS | | | | |
| 5 | DDI | | X | | |
| 6 | DDA | | | | |
| 7 | DDO | | | | |
| 8 | DDS&T | | | | |
| 9 | /Chm/NIC | | X | | |
| 10 | GC | | | | |
| 11 | IG | | | | |
| 12 | Compt | | | | |
| 13 | D/OCA | | | | |
| 14 | D/PAO | | | | |
| 15 | D/PERS | | | | |
| 16 | D/Ex Staff | | | | |
| 17 | | | | | |
| 18 | | | | | |
| 19 | | | | | |
| 20 | | | | | |
| 21 | | | | | |
| 22 | | | | | |

SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks

Executive Secretary

23 Dec '87

Date

3637 (10-81)




DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

December 21, 1987

Executive Registry

87-3777x



MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Guidelines on Interagency Intelligence Production

One of the first matters brought to my attention as I assumed my duties at the Treasury Department was the "Guidelines for Interagency Intelligence Production," as amended and approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) on September 24, 1987. I was informed that the Guidelines were the subject of considerable debate at NFIB, particularly that section titled "The Interagency Process." Apparently, several members expressed concern about the need to ensure clear separation between the intelligence and policy communities during the intelligence production process.

While it is important to maintain a separation between the intelligence and policy communities, the Treasury Department, as an NFIB member, is in the unique situation of requiring the substantive inputs from working level staff in order to make useful and pertinent contributions to the intelligence production process. An extreme interpretation of the phrase "NFIB representatives must ensure Intelligence Community independence from policy community pressures or participation in the drafting and coordination process" would effectively disallow any Treasury participation in the production process; the small size of the Department's intelligence office has traditionally led to a dependence on line offices for analytic support.

Clearly, I am not in favor of senior level policy makers at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level and above attempting to dictate the findings or judgments of an intelligence estimate. However, I would not want to forego using the insights and substantive expertise in the estimative process which are available from working-level Treasury desk officers. Therefore, in the spirit of maintaining the aforementioned balance between the policy and working level, I will interpret the Guidelines to mean that

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

while senior level officials should not interfere with the intelligence production process, the Guidelines do not preclude the involvement of working-level Treasury desk officers and analysts. I believe that this interpretation will protect the independence and integrity of the intelligence process while still allowing the Intelligence Community to take advantage of the substantial reservoir of expertise on economic and financial matters that is resident at the Treasury Department.

I will stand ready to discuss further this matter with you at your convenience.



Randall M. Fort
Special Assistant to the Secretary
(National Security)

(ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION
AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.)

Cls by Signer
Decls OADR

CONFIDENTIAL